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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant Raymond L.
Balentine, will be referred to herein as "Ray"; appellee Corina L. Gehring will be referred
to herein as the "Corina" and appellee Gregg Geliring will be referred to herein as
"Gregg". Ray is the minor child's putative father. Corina is the minor child's mother.
Gregg, at all material times herein, has been married to Corina.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.)
ISSUE ON APPEAL:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
DETERMINED THAT APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER: A) THE DOCTRINE
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL; B) RELEVANT UTAH CASE LAW;
AND C) THE UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Summary judgment shall be rendered if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R.
Civ. P. When a trial court's rulings are based upon a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law, where a correct one would have produced a different result, the party
adversely affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under a
correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings,
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595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912).
Generally, a person's standing to request particular relief presents a question of law. See
Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, \ 18, 82 P.3d
1125. To the extent that factual findings inform the issue of standing, the appellate court
reviews such factual findings made by the trial court with deference. Kearns-Tribune
Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997). "Because of the important policy
considerations involved in granting or denying standing, we closely review trial court
determination of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing,
granting minimal discretion to the trial court." Id. The interpretation of a statute is a
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App
344, Tf 5, 994 P.2d 206 (quoting State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994)).
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 93-95); Verified Memorandum In Support
Of Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Petitioner's Verified Petition To Establish
Paternity And Child Custody (R. 101-119); Verified Memorandum In Opposition To
Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Petitioner's Verified Petition To Establish Paternity
And Child Custody (R. 129-149); Intervener's Response To Petitioner's Verified
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Petitioner's Verified
Petition To Establish Paternity And Child Custody (R. 150-160); Motion Hearing Re:
Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 312); Notice Of Objection To Recommendation (R.
278-280); Order Denying Intervener's Motion for Summary (R. 284-286); Motion
Hearing Re: Objection To Recommendation (R. 313); Findings Of Fact And Conclusions
2

01 Law On Interveners Motion foi Summary Judgment And Intervener

^nd

Respondent's Objection To Recommendation (R 292-296); and Summan Judgment And
Oulti ( )n * >b|ei ti HI 1 o Rcumimendanmi (\" ^ r - ? ( ^ )
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATET
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO TH E \PPF \ L
1 he ioliowmg statutes and iiile are detenninatr c of the appuil w (
iinpnitaiue to tin* apnral

'iili.il

! hese statues and rule are contained in the Addendum.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-204
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-602
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-607
Rule 56(c) Utah R.Ch P

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature n>l (he 1 asc, 1 oui si 1 M 1 i m ci'tlm^s. liitl Disposition llrlow
Tin1 underlying couise of proceedings m this matter is import to die e\aluation of
this appeal. Initially, Ray, the putative father, filed his Verified Petition To Establish
Paternity And ( lnld I ustody on April 25, 2(Mb

I wo da\s laiu on LJUJI J

^m"

Conna the mmoi < lnld ^ inothei, filed her own Verified Petition foi Deolaiation Of
Paternity, Child Custody, Child Support

\nd Visitation.

Corina's action was

consolidated into this matter.
Online tli

lii ,t piiit

>t tlii. (ase, attorney Stephanie E. Sankey ("attorney

Sankey") acted as primary counsel for Ra\

Vttorney Francis Palacios ("attorney

Palacios") represented Corina. At the time this case was filed, the minor child was in
Ray's custod\

Conna contested Ray's custody of the mmoi luld and tikd a Motion
3

For Temporary Restraining Order. Judge Sandra Peuler's minute entry concerning the
hearing on the temporary restraining order, dated May 9, 2005, indicates, "Petitioner
(Balentine) ordered to return child to respondent (Gehring). Petition has no legal rights
to custody or visitation as paternity has not been established and the child is legally the
child of respondent and her husband."
Following Judge Peuler's ruling, on June 2, 2005 Corina filed a Verified Answer
And Amended Petition For Child Custody And Parent Time. Notably, Corina's amended
petition requests that certain requirements be fulfilled prior to Ray exercising parenting
time with the minor child and further seeks that child support be paid by Ray.
During July through late October, 2005 the parties entered into a Case
Management Order and exchanged Initial Disclosures. Ray served his first set of written
discovery on August 29, 2005.
On October 21, 2005, Corina served her responses to Ray's written discovery
requests. On that same date, attorney Palacios filed a Motion To Withdraw As Counsel
Of Record. The order granting Palacios' withdrawal request was granted on October 23,
2005. On October 26, 2005 Ray's counsel filed a Notice To Appear In Person Or
Appoint Counsel. On November 15, 2005, Corina filed a Request For Extension Of
Time To Appear With Counsel. On November 18, 2005 attorney Sankey filed a Notice
Of Withdrawal Of Counsel Of Record and indicated attorney Brett D. Cragun would
continue as counsel in the case. On December 13, 2006, Judge Anthony Quinn granted
Corina an extension to December 31, 2005 to appoint counsel or appear in person. On
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December 29, 2005 attorney Kellie F. Williams ("attorney Williams") entered her
appearance in this matter on behalf of Gregg.
On January 17, 2006 attorney Williams filed a Motion For Summary Judgment
(regarding whether Ray had standing to pursue his paternity claim) and Verified Motion
To Intervene. Ray opposed the Motion For Summary Judgment. The matter was set for
hearing before Commissioner Michelle Blomquist on March 27, 2006.
At the March 27, 2006 hearing, Ray stipulated to Gregg's intervention in this
matter.

After hearing argument from counsel, Commissioner Blomquist stated her

recommendation that the Motion For Summary Judgment be denied. On April 6, 2006
Corina, through attorney Williams, filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss Petition, Amended
Petition For Declaration Of Paternity, Child Custody, Child Support, And Visitation.
(Ray opposed this motion, however, the hearing on this motion was stricken as the result
of the ultimate summary judgment disposition of this case.) Also on April 6, 2006,
Corina and Gregg filed an objection to the recommendation of Commissioner Blomquist.
On May 30, 2006, Judge Quinn heard argument on the Objection To
Recommendation. After argument, the trial court determined that summary judgment
was appropriate and Ray's petition was thereafter denied and dismissed in its entirety.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Corina and Gregg were married on April 30, 1999 in Salt Lake County,

State Of Utah. (R. 102)
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2.

In early 2002, during a period when Gregg and Corina were separated,

Corina was with her brother while participating in a drug rehabilitation program. At this
time she met Ray. (R. 102, 130)
3.

During this period, Corina engaged in sexual relations with Ray and

became pregnant. (R. 35, 102) Corina later moved back in with Gregg in an effort to
reconcile their marriage. (R. 102)
4.

On December 13, 2002, Corina's child was born. (R. 102)

5.

From the time shortly after Corina's pregnancy to approximately October

2003, Ray was generally unaware of Corina's whereabouts, although at one point the
parties had agreed to amend the birth certificate to name Ray as the minor child's father.
(R. 131)
6.

In October 2003, Corina, Gregg, Ray and Ray's wife met to discuss the

situation. During the subsequent few weeks, the parties agreed that genetic testing to
determine paternity would take place. (R. 131)
7.

Ray agreed to pay for the genetic testing. The testing established that Ray

could not be excluded as being the minor child's biological father by any of the ten
genetic marker systems that were analyzed in the testing. (R. 13, 131)
8.

In approximately January 2004, pursuant to an agreement between Ray and

Corina, the minor child began spending alternate weekends with Ray.

On some

occasions, these weekend visits were extended and parenting time would take place from
Thursday evenings to Tuesday evenings. (R. 131-132)
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9.

In February, 2004 Ray began paying, and Gregg and Corina accepted, child

support for the benefit of the minor child. (R. 131)
10.

During a subsequent difficult time in the marriage of Corina and Gregg,

Corina signed a notarized document dated January 13, 2005 which states:
I Corina L. Gehring in sound state and mind give temporary custody of
minor Child Brianna Renee Gehring to her biological father Raymond L.
Balentine. This custody to be effective beginning Jan. 13, 2005 with no
specific amount Of days, months. (R. 148)
11.

From January 2005 to the beginning of these proceedings, the minor child

spent the vast majority of her time in Ray's custody and care. (R. 132)
12.

In early April 2005, Corina decided to terminate the custody she had given

to Ray. In a handwritten and notarized statement, Corina stated as follows:
I Corina L. Gehring in sound state and mind give complete termination of
temporary custody of minor child Brianna Renee Gehring from her
biological father Raymond L. Balentine. This custody was effective
beinning January 13, 2005 with no specific amount of days or months. I
choose, as her primary custody parent, to terminate this temporary custody
as of today, April 8, 2005. (R. 149)
13.

Ray was concerned with Corina's situation and her ability to appropriately

parent at the time Corina terminated the "temporary custody" she had provided to him.
As such, Ray elected to initiate this proceeding. (R. 132)
14.

After Ray filed his action for paternity and child custody, Corina filed her

own action for paternity and also sought establishment of parenting time and child
support. (R. 33-42)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is not warranted in this matter.

At the time summary

judgment was granted there remained questions of material fact and appellees were not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The facts in this case establish that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
appellees should have been precluded from asserting that appellant had no standing to file
a petition for paternity. Moreover, the facts and legal principles in the Schoolcraft and
Pearson decisions referred to by the trial court were not properly applied to the facts of
this case. (The Schoolcraft and Pearson cases are contained in the Addendum.)
The trial court misinterpreted specific provisions of the Utah Uniform Parentage
Act and a correct interpretation of these provisions would properly preclude the granting
of summary judgment in this matter as a matter of law.

Moreover, the trial court

dismissed Ray's claims for custody, even though no argument was made by appellees
regarding this issue. For these reasons, the granting of summary judgment was not
appropriate in this case, and that judgment should be reversed and the case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL ERRED WHEN IF FAILED TO DETERMINE THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED CORINA AND GREGG
FROM CONTESTING RAY'S PATERNITY IN THIS CASE
Utah courts recognize the doctrine of equitable estoppel in paternity cases.
Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, 134 P.3d 173, fn. 11, (Utah Ct. App. 2006). See
8

also, Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Estoppel is an equitable
doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their rights where their actions render it
inequitable to allow them to assert those rights. Id. Estoppel requires proof of tliree
elements: (1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
later-asserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable action or inaction based upon the
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party
that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate its statement,
admission, act, or failure to act. Id.
In this case, the following facts existed (or at the very least were contested) prior
to the time Corina and Gregg asserted that Ray does not have standing to assert his
parentage in this case:
1)

That Corina engaged in sexual relations with Ray during a

time when Corina did not cohabitate with Gregg;
2)

That the parties met after the birth of the minor child and

discussed amending the birth certificate to name Ray as the minor child's
father;
3)

That the parties jointly agreed that genetic testing would take

place to determine who the minor child's father is;
4)

That genetic testing essentially determined that Ray is minor

child's father;
5)

That after genetic testing was completed, Ray spent continual

and substantial time with the minor child with Corina *s permission;
9

6)

That Corina and Gregg received and accepted child support

for minor child's benefit from Ray;
7)

That when Corina again experienced marital problems, she

singed a notarized document that provided custody of the minor child to
Ray in his capacity as the minor child's biological father;
8)

That when Corina sought to terminate Ray's custody of the

minor child, she again signed a handwritten, notarized document which
stated Ray was the minor child's biological father;
9)

That after Ray initiated this action to determine paternity and

child custody, Corina filed her own petition to determine paternity.
Significantly,

Corina's petition sought to have Ray meet certain

requirements before spending parenting time with the minor child and
requested that Ray pay child support; and
10)

That Corina responded to Ray's petition and participated in

discovery in this case prior to raising issues of standing in this matter.
The aforementioned facts clearly establish both Corina's and Gregg's position that
Ray is not only the minor child's father, but that Ray has the duties and obligations to act
as the minor's father. The actions of Gregg and Corina establish their belief that Ray has
the responsibility to provide care, comfort and support for the minor child. Ray relied
upon these facts in bringing this action and participating in his young daughter's life. Ray
has been damaged by Corina's and Gregg's wholesale change of position. Given the
unique facts of this case and the sudden shift of position in this matter, it was
10

fundamentally inequitable for the trial court to ignore the parties' prior actions and
dealings which fully support Ray's status as this child's dad, and then find that Ray has
no right or standing to be recognized as the minor's father. The trial court ignored the
doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case, and erred when it failed to determine that
Corina and Gregg should be estopped from contesting Ray's standing to assert a paternity
action in this case.

POINT II
THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN THE SCHOOLCRAFT DECISION SHOULD
NOT PRECLUDE RAY'S STANDING TO ASSERT A PATERNITY ACTION IN
THIS MATTER
After argument in this case, Commissioner Blomquist recommended that the
Motion For Summary Judgment be denied on the basis that Ray did in fact have standing
to assert his parentage claim under State in re J W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990)
(hereinafter referred to as "Schoolcraft"). The Schoolcraft decision indicates that
"...whether individuals can challenge the presumption of legitimacy should not depend on
their legal status alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether [certain] policies
would be undermined by permitting such a challenge." (emphasis added) The main
"policies" referred to in Schoolcraft include "preserving the stability of the marriage and
protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity."
Shortly after Commissioner Blomquist entered her recommendation denying the
Motion For Summary Judgment, this Court issued its decision in Pearson. The Pearson
decision discusses the Schooler eft factors.

11

Gregg and Corina filed an objection to

Commissioner Blomquist's recommendation citing the Pearson case. At the outset of the
hearing on the objection to Commissioner Blomquist's recommendation, Judge Quinn
indicated he did not believe under the facts of this case that Ray could overcome the "first
prong of the Schoolcraft test." (R. 313) In essence, Judge Quinn held that because the
minor child was born into an "intact marriage", Ray's challenge to paternity would
impact the stability the stability of Gregg and Corina's marriage.
Whether Ray's challenge to paternity could impact the stability of Gregg and
Corina's marriage was, and still is, an open and material question of fact that should have
precluded summary judgment. The record in this case unquestionably establishes that
Corina engaged in a sexual relationship with Ray while she was married to Gregg.
Moreover, Corina's filings with the trial court admittedly indicate that as recently as
January 2005, Corina and Gregg were experiencing difficulty in their marriage. Like the
situation in other cases cited in Schoolcraft, it is apparent the marriage between Gregg
and Corina has already been shaken. While the trial court had an obligation to evaluate
the first prong of the Schoolcraft test in relation to the facts of this case, the trial court
should not have weighed this particular factor so heavily and determined Ray does not
have standing simple because the minor child's mother was married. That fact in and of
itself should not have been dispositive.
The facts in Pearson, which the trial court apparently relied upon, are clearly
different that those of this case. In Pearson it was determined that Thanos (the purported
biological father who was seeking standing) "was unwilling to be known or recognized as
the child's father and did not provide any monetary support toward [the minor child's]
12

parental care or birth costs." Moreover, Thanos had acquiesced in the presumed father's
role as the minor child's father. Thanos only saw the minor child about half a dozen
times during the first sixteen months of the minor's life and did not provide any of the
aforementioned care or support for the minor during that period. Consequently, while
this Court presumed that Thanos had standing at the minor's birth to assert parentage, this
Court determined Thanos later lost his standing because of his conduct. This Court
stated, Lt[W]e cannot see how Thanos9s ability to challenge [the minor child's] paternity
remained necessary after he voluntarily absented himself from [the minor child's] life."
Id.
In this case, however, Ray has fully and completely sought to be a part of his
daughter's life. He paid for genetic testing. He agreed to pay child support. He has
provided for his daughter's care on a frequent and consistent basis whenever he has had
the opportunity.
According to Schoolcraft, a determination regarding standing needs to be made on
a case-by-case basis. There are significant and relevant fact issues which remain at issue.
Judge Quinn appears to have based his ruling solely on the fact that Gregg and Corina are
married. Judge Quinn also stated, 'There's been adequate opportunity in this case to
conduct discovery with respect to that issue, if it was thought to have been helpful." As
the record indicates, however, due to the withdrawal of the primary attorneys in this
matter, as well as the nature of the underlying proceedings, there was not a real chance
for the discovery process to be completed.

Ray was certainly not afforded the

opportunity to fully present evidence on the Schoolcraft factors.
13

Given the unique facts of this case and the policy considerations involved, the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the Schoolcraft and Pearson
decisions. The Pearson decision, while discussing the impact a parentage challenge
could have on a marriage, was more focused on whether the conduct of the person
seeking standing was of sufficient magnitude to cause that person to lose standing. Ray's
course of dealing in this matter establishes he desire to provide care, comfort and support
for his child. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment by too heavily weighing
the fact that Gregg and Corina are married.
POINT III
THE UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE
RAY'S STANDING IN THIS CASE
In May 2005, the Utah Uniform Parentage Act ("Act") became effective. This
chapter of Utah statute applies to determinations of parentage in the State of Utah. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45g-103(l).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201(2) provides in relevant part:
The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by:
(a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity under Section §7845g-204 ... [or] ... (c) an adjudication of the man's paternity;
Pursuant to § 78-45g-2045 Gregg is the presumed father of the minor child. While
this provision of the Act does create a presumption that Gregg is the minor's (legal)
father, it is also clear that this statutory presumption is rebuttable. Section 78-45-204(2)
states, "A presumption of paternity established under this section may only be rebutted in
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accordance with Section 78-45g-607." Section 78-45g-602, which is also relevant to this
case, also references Section 78-45g-607. Section 78-45g-602 states provides:
78-45g-602. Standing to maintain proceeding.
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity, and Sections
78-45g-607 and 78-45g-609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be
maintained by:
(1) the child;
(2) the mother of the child;
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency
authorized by other law;
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency;
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who
would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased,
incapacitated, or a minor; or
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement.
Consequently, these statutes plainly establish that the presumption that Gregg is
the minor's father is rebuttable. Further, it is clear that subject to any limitation set forth
in Section 78-45-607, Ray may maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage.
It is with regard to the purpose and scope of § 78-45g-607 where there is
disagreement. The trial court determined § 78-45g-607 limits those who have standing to
bring a parentage action to only a mother or presumed father. Appellant, on the other
hand, reads § 78-45g-607 to limit the time in which a mother or presumed father may
bring a parentage action, but does not expressly provide a limitation on the others listed
on § 78-45g-602.
At the objection hearing relating to Commissioner Blomquisfs recommendation,
Judge Quinn stated as follows:

15

Let me start with the statute. The statue says, in essence, that the
presumption of paternity can only be rebutted as set forth in - - I think it's
607, part 607 of the statute, and maybe - - I don't have it in front of me.
That may not be right. That section of the statute only refers to the rebuttal
of the presumption by the mother and the father.
It's my inclination to take the legislature at its word. Where there's no
mention of anybody else having the authority or the ability to challenge the
presumption, I think "only" means only; and the absence of any reference
to the biological father or the declared father or anybody else having the
ability at any time to rebut the presumption, I have to take as being an
intentional omission.
Judge Quinn in essence indicates that the word "only" is an important word
contained in the relevant statutes. Such is not the case. The word "only" is not part of §
78-45-602. Section 78-45g-607 reads as follows (with the relevant portion on bold
print):
78-45g-607. Limitation — Child having presumed father.
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a
presumed father as described in Subsection 78-45g-204(l)(a), (b)5 or
(c), may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any time
prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of
the divorce of the parents.
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be
ordered by the tribunal in accordance with Section 78-45g-608. Failure of
the mother of the child to appear for testing may result in an order allowing
a motherless calculation of paternity. Failure of the mother to make the
child available may not result in a determination that the presumed father is
not the father, but shall allow for appropriate proceedings to compel the
cooperation of the mother. If the question of paternity has been raised in the
pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal addresses the issue and enters an
order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue again, and the order of
the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact.
(b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity,
then denial of a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to
disregard genetic test results shall be based on a preponderance of the
evidence.
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother
16

has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be
in the best interests of the child to disestablish the parent-child relationship.
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 7845g-204(l)(d), the presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal
determines that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the
probable time of conception.
(3) The presumption may be rebutted by:
(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father;
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father
in accordance with Section 78-45g-505;
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the
probable time of conception; or
(d) an adjudication under this part.
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly
served and there has been a final adjudication of the issue.
Apparently it is true that the legislative history indicates Section 78-45g-607 was
originally introduced with the word "only" before the language "be raised by the
presumed father or the mother/' however, the word "only" was removed prior to the
section becoming enacted:
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a
presumed father as described in Subsection 78-45g-204 (l)(a), (b), or (c),
may H. [ &nty ] .H be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any
time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of
the divorce of the parents.
{See Amendment to S.B. 014, dated February 16, 2005.)
Appellant argues that a correct reading Section 78-45g-607 simply limits the time
in which a presumed father or mother may raise paternity issues. Pursuant to the statute,
a mother or presumed father can raise the issue prior to a divorce proceeding or in the
pleadings at the time of a divorce. With the exception of a mother and presumed father,
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Section 78-45g-607, on its face, does not limit those listed in 78~45g-602 from initiating a
paternity action.
Appellant's reading of the statute simply makes more sense than alternative
interpretations. By requiring a mother or presumed father to raise any paternity issues
prior to or as part of a divorce proceeding, a mother or presumed father is precluded from
later using paternity issues to impact child support and parenting time. For example,
without this statutory provision, a presumed father may be ordered to pay child support as
part of a divorce proceeding. If the presumed father becomes unhappy with the situation,
he might later claim that he is not the biological father of the child and assert a paternity
challenge in order to attempt to relieve himself of the support obligation. Likewise, a
mother who becomes disgruntled with a parenting time arrangement ordered by a trial
court may raise issues of paternity in an attempt to augment or preclude parenting time.
It is clear the Utah Uniform Parentage Act is modeled after and is substantially
similar to the Uniform Parentage Act. One area where the Utah statute differs from the
text of the model act relates to § 78-45g-607. Section 607 of the model act (and the
comment related thereto) states as follows:
§ 607. Limitation: Child Having Presumed Father.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a proceeding brought by
a presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the
parentage of a child having a presumed father must be commenced not later
than two years after the birth of the child.
(b) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between
a child and the child's presumed father may be maintained at any time if the
court determines that:
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(1) the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited
nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the
probable time of conception; and
(2) the presumed father never openly held out the child as his own.
COMMENT
2006 Electronic Pocket Part Update
Source: UPA (1973) § 6; cf UPC (1993) § 2-114(c).
This section deals with difficult issues. First, it establishes the right of a
mother or a presumed marital or nonmarital father to challenge the
presumption of his paternity established by § 204. Second, it clarifies the
right of a third-party male to claim paternity of a child who has an existing
presumed father.
UPA (1973) § 6(a) places a [five-year] limitation on the time in which a
proceeding may be brought "for the purpose of declaring the non-existence
of the father and child relationship presumed under [the Act]." At that time,
the comment noted that:
"Ten states have denied standing to a man claiming to be the father when
the mother was married to another at the time of the child's birth. In some
of these states, even though a presumed father may seek to rebut his
presumed paternity, a third-party male will be denied standing to raise that
same issue."
As of the year 2000, the right of an "outsider" to claim paternity of a child
born to a married woman varies considerably among the states. Thirty-tliree
states allow a man alleging himself to be the father of a child with a
presumed father to rebut the marital presumption. Some states have granted
this right through legislation, while in other states case law has recognized
the alleged father's right to rebut the presumption and establish his
paternity. In some states, there is both statutory and common law support
for the standing of a man alleging himself to be the father to assert his
paternity of a child born to a married woman. Not that long ago, some
states imposed an absolute bar on a man commencing a proceeding to
establish his paternity if state law provides a statutory presumption of the
paternity of another man. See Michael H v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
It is increasingly clear that those days are coming to an end.
The new UPA attempts to establish a middle ground on these exceedingly
complex issues. Subsection (a) establishes a two-year limitation for
19

rebutting the presumption of paternity established under § 204 if the mother
and presumed father were cohabiting at the time of conception. The
presumption of paternity may be attacked by the mother, the presumed
father, or a third-party male during this limited period; thereafter the
presumption is immune from attack by any of those individuals except as
provided in subsection (b).
The reverse fact situation is also clear; a presumption of paternity may be
challenged at any time if the mother and the presumed father were not
cohabiting and did not engage in sexual intercourse at the probable time of
conception and the presumed father never openly held out the child as his
own.
Under the fact circumstances described in subsection (b), nonpaternity of
the presumed father is generally assumed by all the parties as a practical
matter. It is inappropriate for the law to assume a presumption known by all
those concerned to be untrue.
The issue in this case is one of standing. Pursuant to § 78-45g-602(3), "a man
whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated55 has standing to maintain a paternity
action unless standing is limited by § 78-45g-607. Section 78-45g-607 only limits a
"presumed father55 from maintaining an action if a divorce has occurred. Ray is not the
presumed father, so § 78-45g-607 has no impact on his standing to maintain this action.
As such, summary judgment was not appropriate.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISPOSED OF RAY'S PETITION
FOR CUSTODY BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT
The trial court not only dismissed Ray5s paternity claim, but also dismissed his
claim for custody. Significantly, it was never expressly argued to the trial court that Ray
did not have standing to assert a custody claim.
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The Schoolcraft decision makes clear that, "Certain people because of their
relationship to a child, are at least entitled to standing to seek a determination as to
whether it would be in the best interests of the child for them to have custody."
The Schoolcraft court later continued:

Equally important is the person's status or relationship to the
child. Even if a person has no legal duty of support to a child, that
person's legal relationship to the child may suffice for standing.
Examples include close relatives, who, although lacking a duty of
support, may be perceived by reason of that relationship to have the
child's best interests at heart. Such a relationship would seem to
warrant a grant of standing.
The Schoolcraft court concluded by stating:
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial proceeding.
Indeed, our case and the legislature's pronouncements indicate that the
interests of children are best served when those interested in the children
are permitted to assert that interest. The question of who should have
custody of the child is too important to exclude participants on narrowly
drawn technical grounds, as did the court of appeals. Those who have legal
or personal connections with the child should not be precluded from being
heard on best interests.
Based upon the reasoning set forth in Schoolcraft and the facts of this case, there is
no reason why Ray's claim for custody should have been dismissed by way of summary
judgment. At the very least, there are questions of material fact relating to what is in the
minor child's best interests. As such, summary judgment on is the issue of custody was
not appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant requests that this Court reverse the summary
judgment decision of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <5Q day of October, 2006.

BfeOf. Cragun
Attorney For Petitioner/Appellant
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant
was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to
said individuals at the following address this 3^
Corina Gehring
332 West Harvard Drive
Midvale,UT 84047
Gregg Gehring
332 West Harvard Drive
Midvale,UT 84047
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day of October, 2006.

ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-204. Presumption of paternity.
(1) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
(a) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is
bom during the marriage;
(b) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is
born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation;
(c) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each
other in apparent compliance with law, even if the attempted marriage is or could
be declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300
days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce
or after a decree of separation; or
(d) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other
in apparent compliance with law, whether or not the marriage is, or could be
declared, invalid, he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and there is no
other presumptive father of the child, and:
(i) the assertion is in a record filed with the Office of Vital Records;
(ii) he agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate; or
(iii) he promised in a record to support the child as his own.
(2) A presumption of paternity established under this section may only be
rebutted in accordance with Section 78-45g-607.
(3) If a child has an adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are
inadmissable to challenge paternity except as set forth in Section 78-45g-607.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-602. Standing to maintain proceeding.
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity, and Sections 78~45g-607
and 78-45g-609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by:
(1) the child;
(2) the mother of the child;
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency authorized
by other law;
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency;
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would
otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated,
or a minor; or
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-607. Limitation — Child having presumed
father.
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed

father as described in Subsection 78-45g-204(l)(a), (b), or (c), may be raised by
the presumed father or the mother at any time prior to filing an action for divorce
or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents.
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be ordered
by the tribunal in accordance with Section 78-45g-608. Failure of the mother of
the child to appear for testing may result in an order allowing a motherless
calculation of paternity. Failure of the mother to make the child available may not
result in a determination that the presumed father is not the father, but shall allow
for appropriate proceedings to compel the cooperation of the mother. If the
question of paternity has been raised in the pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal
addresses the issue and enters an order, the parties are estopped from raising the
issue again, and the order of the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of
material mistake of fact.
(b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, then
denial of a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to disregard
genetic test results shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother has the
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best
interests of the child to disestablish the parent-child relationship.
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 78-45g204(1 )(d), the presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal determines
that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged
in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception.
(3) The presumption may be rebutted by:
(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father;
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father in
accordance with Section 78-45g-505;
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable
time of conception; or
(d) an adjudication under this part.
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly served
and there has been a final adjudication of the issue.
Rule 56(c) U. R. Civ. P.
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
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volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence
and evidence that is "so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives
the prosecution notice of a duty to produce." 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399.
Specifically, the Court held that due process is violated if the undisclosed evidence, had it been disclosed, would have
created a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.26
On the second day of the initial trial,
October 13, 1988, the court granted Trafny's motion for a mistrial based upon the
fact that the prosecution had failed to supply Trafny with lab reports that compared
samples of hair, blood, and saliva taken
from Trafny with samples of hair and semen taken from the clothing worn by the
victim on the night of the alleged rape.
The semen sample matched Trafny's blood
type exactly; however, the laboratory was
unable to match the pubic hair samples
taken from the victim's clothing with Trafny's hair samples.
In the instant case, there is no indication
that the prosecution intentionally or in bad
faith withheld any of the lab reports in
order to cause a mistrial, thereby improving the chances of conviction in a new trial.
Trafny claims that the failure to supply the
lab reports cannot be explained as a simple
oversight. Nevertheless, we perceive no
prejudice toward Trafny because of the
prosecution's failure to supply the lab reports. Indeed, Trafny did not attempt to
suppress the evidence in the inculpatory
portion of the lab reports in the November
trial. In addition, he stipulated to the admission of the exhibits underlying the lab
reports.
Trafny has failed to demonstrate, either
by evidence or by argument, how he was
prejudiced by the failure of the prosecutor
to disclose the exculpatory evidence before
the October trial. The record does not
reflect bad faith on the part of the prosecution by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence in an effort to provoke a mistrial in order to gain some tactical advan26. Jarrell, 608 P.2d at 224; see also State v.
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988); State v.

tage. Indeed, the prosecution attempted to
introduce both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence at the October trial and met
with no objection when the evidence was
introduced at the November trial. We conclude that the prosecution did not exercise
bad faith under the facts of this case and
that Trafny was not placed in double jeopardy because of the retrial.
We have duly considered Trafny's other
claims and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

STATE of Utah in the Interest of
J.W.F., a person under eighteen
years of age.
Petition of Winfield D.
SCHOOLCRAFT.
No. 890001.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 19, 1990.
Husband petitioned for custody of
child born to wife during marriage. Child's
guardian ad litem filed petition seeking determination that husband had no rights in
child. The Second District Court, Weber
County, Robert L. Newey, J., found that
husband was not biological father of child
and thus had no right to custody. Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and husband petitioned for writ of
certiorari. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) child's guardian ad
litem had standing to challenge presumpCarter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985).
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tion of legitimacy of child born during marriage; (2) evidence was sufficient to rebut
presumption of husband's paternity beyond
reasonable doubt; and (3) husband had
standing, as child's stepparent, to seek custody of child.
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
1. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>34
Generally, class of persons permitted
to challenge presumption of husband's paternity of child born during marriage
should be limited.
2. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>34
Whether certain persons can challenge
presumption of legitimacy of child born
during marriage should depend not on their
legal status alone, but on a case-by-case
determination of whether paramount considerations of preserving stability of marriage and protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their
paternity would be undermined by permitting challenge.
3. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=34
Child's guardian ad litem had standing
to challenge presumption of legitimacy of
child born during marriage, where child's
custody as opposed to his mere technical
legitimacy was at issue, stability of marriage had previously been shaken, and child
never had relationship with any alleged
father, and :hus had no expectations as to
who his father was.
4. Witnesses; @=>57
Husband's concession on appeal that
he was not child's biological father could
not be relied upon to rebut presumption of
legitimacy of child born during marriage,
since such reliance would contravene "Lord
Mansfield's rule," which precludes husband
and wife from saying after marriage that
offspring is spurious.
5. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=43
Evidence was sufficient to support conclusion that presumption of husband's paternity of child born during marriage was
rebutted beyond reasonable doubt, where
blood tests indicated that husband was not

biological father of child and child was
partly of African ancestry while husband
and wife were both of Anglo-Saxon ancestry. U.C.A.1953, 78-25-18, 78-25-21.
6. Infants <s=>l 9.3(1)
Parent and Child ®»2(7), 15
Fact that person is not child's natural
or legal parent does not mean that person
must stand as total stranger to child where
custody is concerned; certain people, because of their relationship to child, are at
least entitled to standing to seek determination as to whether it would be in best
interests of child for them to have custody.
7. Infants <£=>19.3(1)
Legally enforceable financial obligations that nonparent has toward child
may suffice to give nonparent standing to
seek custody; however, grant of standing
cannot be determined solely by reference to
legal support obligations.
8. Parent and Child <s=>14
Stepparent, regardless of whether he
or she stands in loco parentis to child, is
to be treated as relative of child and is
entitled to hearing to determine whether it
would be in best interests of child to grant
stepparent visitation rights, since.' statute
requires stepparent to support spouse's
children. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-4.1.
9. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>20
Parent and Child <s=>14
Husband had standing to seek custody
of child born into his marriage whe was not
his biological offspring, since husband was
child's stepparent, and husband had legal
obligation of support prior to dissolution of
marriage. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(4), 30-5-2,
78-45-2(14), 78-4.5-4.1.

Richard W. Jones, Ogden, for petitioner.
Martin W. Custen, Jane A. Marquardt,
Ogden, for J.W.F.
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra Sjogren, Paul
M. Tinker, Diane Wilkins, Salt La.ke City,
for State of Utah.
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Winfield Schoolcraft seeks review of a
decision of the court of appeals which held
that the juvenile court acted correctly when
it (i) determined that he has no parental
rights in a child born to his wife during
their marriage because he is not the biological father of the child and (ii) declined to
hold a hearing to determine whether it
would be in the best interests of the child,
J.W.F., to place him in Schoolcraft's custody. We reverse the court of appeals' decision insofar as it indicates that Schoolcraft
has no standing to petition for custody of
J.W.F. and remand to the trial court for a
hearing to determine whether it would be
in the best interests of J.W.F. for Schoolcraft to have custody.
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were
married on October 6, 1984. They lived
together for approximately eight months
after their marriage. The record is unclear
as to the exact date on which Linda left
Winfield, but it was seven months to one
year prior to her giving birth to a son,
J.W.F., in Utah on November 5, 1985. Linda abandoned J.W.F. on or about December
5, 1985.
A petition was filed by the State in the
juvenile court on December 13, 1985, alleging neglect and abandonment by Michael
Ford, the alleged natural father, and Linda
Schoolcraft, the mother. The court appointed a lawyer, Jane Marquardt, as
guardian ad litem on December 24, 1985.
On February 19, 1986, the court found
J.W.F. to be neglected and abandoned and
placed him in the custody of the State
Division of Family Services, where he has
been ever since.
Winfield, who is still technically married
to Linda, was living in California and was
unaware of the pregnancy. He found out
about J.W.F.'s birth in August of 1986,
when he learned of the neglect and abandonment petition that had been filed by
that state in juvenile court in 1985. J.W.F.
was about nine months old at the time.
Winfield then promptly filed a petition for
custody in juvenile court on August 28,
1986, alleging that he was the presumed
father because he was married to Linda

and was living with her at the time of
conception.
A petition for permanent termination of
the parental rights of Michael Ford and
Linda Schoolcraft was filed on September
5, 1986, and on December 16, 1986, the
guardian ad litem filed another petition,
alleging that Winfield Schoolcraft had no
legal rights to J.W.F. This petition, seeking a determination that Winfield Schoolcraft had no rights in J.W.F., was based on
an allegation by the guardian ad litem that
Winfield was not the biological father of
J.W.F. or, alternatively, that he was an
unfit parent or had abandoned the child.
After a hearing held on the two petitions,
the court entered an order permanently
depriving Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft of their parental rights. Both Winfield Schoolcraft's petition for custody and
the guardian ad litem's petition to terminate Winfield's legal rights were continued
to February 10, 1987.
On February 10th, the trial court entered
a memorandum decision finding that Winfield Schoolcraft was not the biological father of J.W.F. and concluding that he had
no right to custody. In essence, because
Schoolcraft was not the child's natural father, the trial court denied Schoolcraft
standing to assert a claim that it was in the
child's best interests that he have custody.
The court continued J.W.F.'s placement in
the Utah State Division of Family Services
for the purpose of finding suitable adoptive
parents. Nothing in the record indicates
that anyone is waiting to adopt J.W.F. at
this time. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.
The central question before us is what
rights, including custodial rights, a husband has in a child born into his marriage
who is not his biological offspring. Before
addressing this question, several preliminary issues must be dealt with.
First, the court of appeals held that the
trial court properly permitted the guardian
ad litem to challenge the presumption that
a child born during a marriage is the husband's natural child, relying on our decision
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in Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 107 (Utah of whether the above-stated policies would
1986), and Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, be undermined by permitting the chal164-66, 340 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1959). The lenge.1
court of appeals reasoned that the guardi[3] Applying these criteria to the
an is the representative of the child and the
present
case, we reach the same :*esult as
child is an indispensible party to the prothe
court
of appeals, albeit for different
ceeding with independent interests to asreasons.
The
guardian ad litem was represert. In re J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 1221
senting
the
child,
one not disinterested in
(Utah Ct.App.1988). Schoolcraft attacks
the
issue,
because
his custody, rather than
this ruling. He argues that in order to
his
mere
technical
legitimacy, is at issue.
preserve the sanctity of the marriage relaMoreover,
allowing
the State or J.W.F. to
tionship, only the wife and the husband
challenge
the
presumption
of legitimacy is
should be permitted to challenge the legitinot
inconsistent
with
the
relevant policy
macy of a child born into their marriage.
considerations.
The
stability
of .;he marIf Schoolcraft is correct, then the trial
riage
between
W.infield
and
Lind^
Schoolcourt erred in permitting the guardian ad
craft
was
shaken
long
ago,
and
their
marlitem to challenge Schoolcraft's paternity
riage
is
one
in
name
only.
Similarly,
J.W.
and Schoolcraft is entitled to a legal preF.'s
expectations
as
to
who
his
lather
is
sumption that he is J.W.F.'s father.
cannot be shaken by permitting a challenge
[1,2] We find the court of appeals' to the presumption of legitimacy. The
analysis on this point to be too mechanistic child has never had a relationship with
and, consequently, is insufficiently sensi- Schoolcraft, Michael Ford, or even his
tive to the legitimate policy considerations mother, so he has no expectations as to
Schoolcraft raises. However, we find who his father is. Having considered the
Schoolcraft's approach similarly flawed. legal status of the challenger and the releWe agree that, as a general matter, the vant policies that bear on the ques.tion, we
class of persons permitted to challenge the conclude that the guardian ad litem was
presumption of paternity should be limited, properly granted standing to challenge the
as he argues, but we reject the notion that presumption of legitimacy in this case.
the legal status of the prospective challenger is the only relevant factor, as the court
of appeals held. In determining who can
challenge the presumption of legitimacy, a
paramount consideration should be preserving the stability of the marriage and protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity. See
Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518
P.2d 687, 689 (1974); Holder v. Holder, 9
Utah 2d at 165, 340 P.2d at 763. This leads
us to conclude that whether individuals can
challenge the presumption of legitimacy
should depend not on their legal status
alone, but on a case-by-case determination

A second claim Schoolcraft raises is that
the court of appeals improperly found the
presumption of legitimacy to have been
rebutted in this case. In Utah, 'the presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless
the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt" Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 166, 340
P.2d at 763. And, consistent with the historically strong policies that underlie that,
presumption, the form of proof admissible
to rebut the presumption is limited. One of
these limits that is part of our common law
is "Lord Mansfield's rule." 2 As stated by
this court, the rule is that "spouses themselves may not give testimony which would

1. Three Utah cases dealing with standing to
challenge a child's legitimacy arc consistent
with this approach. In Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d
106 (Utah 1986), Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982), and Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393,
518 P.2d 687 (1974), the court allowed both the
husband and the wife to challenge the presumption of legitimacy, but in each of these cases, no
reason existed to deny them standing because

the stability of their marriage had already been
shaken.
2. Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 9-3 Eng.Reprint 1257 (1777), wherein Lord Mansfield said:
"[I]t is a rule founded in decency, morality, and
policy that they [husband and wife] s.iould not
be permitted to say after marriage that the offspring is spurious."

714

Utah

799 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

tend to ^legitimatize the child." Lopes, 30
Utah 2d at 395, 518 P.2d at 689. u[T]he
proof of such facts where necessary [must]
come from other sources." Id. at 396, 518
P.2d at 689.
In Utah, the legislature has not abrogated Lord Mansfield's rule, but has specified
that certain nontraditional evidence is capable of conclusively rebutting the presumption of legitimacy. In Teece v. Teece, 715
P.2d 106, 107 (Utah 1986), the court observed that Lord Mansfield's rule has been
substantially eroded by the enactment of
section 78-25-18 of the code, which expressly mandates that courts utilize blood
tests to assist in making a determination of
paternity. Section 78-25-18 provides: "In
any civil action or in bastardy proceedings
in which the parentage of a person is a
relevant fact, the court shall order the child
and alleged parents to submit to blood
tests." Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-18 (1987).
Section 78-25-21 states: "The results of
the [blood] tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of all examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that the
alleged father is not the actual father of
the child, and the question of paternity
shall be so resolved." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-25-21 (1987 & Supp.1990).
The trial court found that it was scientifically impossible for Schoolcraft to be
J.W.F.'s father based on blood tests and
testimony by Dr. Charles DeWitt regarding
the results of the blood tests. This is consistent with sections 78-25-18 and 78-2521. The court also relied on the fact that
J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft are both of
Anglo-Saxon ancestry.
[4, 5] The court of appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's paternity finding on
alternate grounds, i.e., Schoolcraft's concession on appeal that he is not the biological father of J.W.F. This was error because in relying on Schoolcraft's concession, the court relied on evidence that contravenes Lord Mansfield's rule.3 This does
3. See Note, J. W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's
Rights to His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under
Utah Law, 1989 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 955, for a reflec-

not mean that the presumption of legitimacy was not effectively rebutted, however.
We conclude that the evidence before the
trial court was sufficient to support its
conclusion that the presumption of paternity was rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt.
We therefore affirm that portion of the
court of appeals' ruling for the reasons
given by the trial court.
Having found that the guardian ad litem
had standing to raise the issue and that the
presumption of paternity was successfully
rebutted, we next consider the question of
whether Schoolcraft has any protectable
custodial interest with respect to J.W.F., a
child not biologically his, born to his wife
during their marriage. Schoolcraft argues
that he is J.W.F.'s legal father because of
his relationship with Linda. Therefore, his
parental rights, including his right to custody, cannot be terminated without a showing of unfitness. The court of appeals
rejected this argument. It stated that once
the presumption that a child bom during a
marriage is the husband's child is rebutted,
the husband is not the child's legal father.
In such a circumstance, the court of appeals reasoned, the husband has no financial obligation of support toward the child
and therefore has no rights with respect to
the child, including custodial rights. In re
J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah Ct.App.
1988).
[6] Again, we find this analytical approach to be too mechanical. It may be
that no one has the same rights toward a
child as his or her parents. See Wilson v.
Family Services Div., Region Two, 554
P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1976). However, the
fact that a person is not a child's natural or
legal parent does not mean that he or she
must stand as a total stranger to the child
where custody is concerned. Certain people, because of their relationship to a child,
are at least entitled to standing to seek a
determination as to whether it would be in
the best interests of the child for them to
have custody. See id.
tivc and instructive analysis of court of appeals'
decision.
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[7] We conclude that several factors
may justify granting a person standing to
petition for custody of a child. As the
court of appeals noted, the legally enforceable financial obligations that a person has
toward a cliUd may suffice to give that
person standing to seek custody. However, the grant of standing cannot be determined solely by reference to legal support
obligations. Equally important is the person's status or relationship to the child.
Even if a person has no legal duty of
support to a child, that person's legal relationship to the child may suffice for standing. Examples include close relatives, who,
although lacking a duty of support, may be
perceived by reason of that relationship to
have the child's best interests at heart.
Such a relationship would seem to v/arrant
a grant of standing.4
Our cases recognize the right of relatives
other than parents to have standing to seek
custody. In Wilson v. Family Services
Division, Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah
1976), a grandmother sought to restrain
family services from placing her grandchild, who was parentless, out for adoption
until she could have a hearing on her own
fitness as custodian and/or adoptive parent. The court stated that while only parents have vested rights to the custody of
children, "next of kin, such as this grandmother, do have some dormant or inchoate
right or interest in the custody and welfare
of the children who become parentless, so
that they may come forward and assert
their claim." Wilson, 554 P.2d at 23L Ac4.

In addition, it is conceivable that persons who
are not related by blood or marriage, although
not presumptively entitled to standing, could
show that they had a relationship with the child
that would warrant a grant of standing. Wc
have no such situation before us today.

5. The court in Gribble actually required that the
stepparent si.and in loco parentis to the child
before he would be granted a hearing. The
court was inlerpreting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1953), as amended, which stated that, "visitation rights of parenls, grandparents and other
relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child." The court said that in order
for a stepparent to get visitation rights, he must,
therefore, "si.and in the relationship of parent,
grandparent, or other relative to this child."
Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. The court indicated
that if Utah had a statutory provision obligating

cording to Wilson, inchoate rights entitle
the relative to standing to such a hearing
to determine custodial fitness.
[8] A similar standing result obtained
in a Utah divorce case, where this court
held that a stepparent has the right to have
a hearing to determine whether it is in the
child's best interest to grant the stepparent
visitation rights. Gribble v. Gribble, 583
P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).5 In a custody case,
we stated that in "custody matters, all
things else being equal, near relatives
should generally be given preference over
non-relatives." In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d
296, 298, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (1966). And in
yet another case, this court said that when
determining the best interests of the child,
a court may consider stepparent status.
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41
(Utah 1982).
[9] Utah statutes also support 'he right
of relatives other than parents to standing
to seek custody. The legislature has allowed visitation rights for grandparents
and other relatives. Section 30-5-2 of the
code states that the court "may grant
grandparents reasonable rights cf visitation to grandchildren, if it is in the best
interest of the grandchildren." Utah Code
Ann. § 30-5-2 (1989). In addition, in divorce decrees, when "determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and
other relatives, the court shall consider the
welfare of the child." Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(4) (1989).
the stepparent to support the child, the stepparent would have the same status as a p2rent or at
least a relative and would be entitled to a hearing on visitation. However, because no such
statute existed at the time, the court required
the stepparent to stand in loco parentis to the
child.
Utah has since enacted the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, section 78-45—^--1, which
requires a stepparent to support his or her
spouse's children.
See Utah Cede Ann.
§ 78-45-4.i (1987). According to the court's
rationale, then, a stepparent, regardless of
whether he or she .stands in loco parentis to the
child, is to be treated as a relative of the child
and is entitled to a hearing to determine whether it would be in the best interests of the child
to grant the stepparent visitation rights.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
Schoolcraft has standing to seek custody of
J.W.F. First, he is J.W.F.'s stepparent. A
stepparent is defined as "a person ceremonially married to the child's natural or
adoptive custodial parent who is not the
child's natural or adoptive parent" Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-2(14) (Supp.1990). Our
case law indicates that the stepparent relationship Schoolcraft shares with J.W.F. is
sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on
custody. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41; see
also Gribble, 583 P.2d at 64.
In addition, Schoolcraft has the legal obligation of support that the court of appeals thought indispensible to confer standing. The court of appeals was incorrect
when it said that Schoolcraft has no legal
obligation to J.W.F. As a stepparent,
Schoolcraft has the obligation to "support a
stepchild to the same extent that a natural
. . . parent is required to support a child"
so long as the stepparent's marriage to the
natural parent continues. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-4.1 (1987). In light of Schoolcraft's stepparent relationship with J.W.F.
and his legal support obligation, we find
dual grounds for granting him standing to
seek a hearing on whether it would be in
the best interests of J.W.F. for him to have
custody.
There is no reason to narrowly restrict
participation in custodial proceedings. Indeed, our case law and the legislature's
pronouncements indicate that the interests
of the child are best served when those
interested in the child are permitted to assert that interest. The question of who
should have custody of the child is too
important to exclude participants on narrowly drawn technical grounds, as did the
court of appeals. Those who have legal or
personal connections with the child should
not be precluded from being heard on best
interests. Of course, granting Schoolcraft
a hearing on best interests does not mean
that he has any presumption of entitlement
of custody. The court still must determine
what custody arrangement would serve the
best interests of J.W.F. and act accordingly. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-39(13)(b)
(Supp.1990); accord Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1987);

Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 40; Gribble, 583
P.2d at 66.
Schoolcraft raises two other issues:
whether the presumption of paternity is
irrebuttable and whether the juvenile court
had jurisdiction to determine the issue of
Schoolcraft's paternity. Both of these issues have been addressed adequately by
the court of appeals and will not be discussed here. In re J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217,
1219-22 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
The court of appeals' decision is reversed
insofar as it states that Schoolcraft has no
standing to petition for custody of J.W.F.
We remand for a hearing to determine
whether it would be in the best interest of
J.W.F. for Schoolcraft to have custody.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.
(o
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Background: Husband initiated divorce
proceedings, and putative father of child,
who was born during husband's marriage,
moved to intervene in the proceedings.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone Medley, J., granted father's motion to intervene and awarded
joint legal custody of child to wife and
father, and husband appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J
held that father lacked standing to challenge paternity of child.
Reversed and remanded.

4. Children Out-of-Wedlock c=>3, 34
Divorce <£^>73
Putative father of child, who was born
during wife's marriage, lacked standing to
challenge paternity of child and should not
have been allowed to intervene in divorce
action brought by husband; parties stayed
together in marriage for over a year after
husband became aware of father's paternity
of child, father's challenge to child's paternity
was both disruptive and unnecessary, child
had formed paternal bonds with husband,
and husband was presumed to be the legal
father of child born into his marriage.
West's U.C.A. § 30-1-17.2(2).
5. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>34
Parties' shared parentage of child represented stabilizing force in their marriage
whose effect potential of paternity challenge
would diminish, and, thus, even after parties
filed for divorce, putative father's challenge
to paternity of child, who was born during
marriage, could be said to have had some
undermining effect on stability of parties'
marriage within meaning of Schoolcraft's
public policy analysis for whether father had
standing to challenge child's paternity; while
reality of parties' divorce might minimize
importance of first Schoolcraft prong, namely
preservation of marriage, it did not obviate
that prong altogether.

1. Action <s=>13
Generally, a person's standing to request
particular relief presents a question of law.
2. Appeal and Error <®^1024.1
To the extent that factual findings inform the issue of standing, appellate courts
review such factual determinations made by
a trial court with deference.
3. Appeal and Error @=>1024.1
Because of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying
standing, appellate courts closely review trial
court determinations of whether a given set
of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the trial
court.

6. Infants <^34
Schoolcraft analysis for determining
whether putative father may challenge child's
paternity is not intended to protect children
from all attacks on their paternity, but, rather, only those that are disruptive and unnecessary.
7. Children Out-of-Wedlock ®=>1
In the rare instance where a child born
into a marriage is fathered by another man,
the husband is nevertheless deemed the father of the child, with all concomitant rights
and responsibilities, unless and until his paternity is successfully challenged under the
Uniform Parentage Act. West's U.C.A.
§ 30-1-17.2(4).
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8. Children Out-of-Wedlock «^=>9
An illegitimate child born into a marriage is immediately subject to a de facto
adoption by the mother's husband.

ther. Z.P. was born in September 1999, and
Father was named as Z.P.'s father on his
birth certificate. Father and Mother raised
Z.P. together until they separated in May
2000. After separation and until the trial
court's custody determination, the Pearsons
Paige Bigelow, Kruse Landa Maycock & voluntarily shared physical custody of Z.P. on
Ricks LLC, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. a fifty-fifty basis.1
Steven H. Gunn, Ray Quinney & Nebeker,
114 Mother informed Thanos in January
Kellie F. Williams, and Jarrocl H. Jennings, 1999 that she believed him to be Z.P.'s bioCorporon Williams & Bradford, Salt Lake logical father. Thanos was unwilling to be
City, for Appellees.
known or recognized as the child's father and
did not provide any monetary support toward
Before Judges GREENWOOD, ORME,
Z.P.'s prenatal care or birth costs. Thanos
and THORNE.
acquiesced in Father's role as Z.P.'s father.
OPINION
From birth until about January 2001, the
first sixteen months of Z.P.'s life, Thanos did
THORNE, Judge:
not provide any care or support for Z.P. and
111 Kelly F. Pearson (Father) appeals from only saw him about half a dozen times.
the trial court's supplemental decree of di115 In December 2000, Father initiated
vorce awarding joint legal custody of the
divorce proceedings. Thanos moved to interminor child Z.P. to Kimberlee Y. Pearson
vene in the proceedings in January 2001,
(Mother) and intervenor Peter D. Thanos.
claiming that he was Z.P.'s biological father.
We reverse.
Concurrently, Mother denied Father's paternity of Z.P. in her answer and asked the trial
BACKGROUND
court to declare that Father was not Z.P.'s
U2 Father and Mother (collectively the biological father and that he had no rights of
Pearsons) married in 1992. In July 1997, the custody or visitation with Z.P. Father opcouple had their first child, N.P. In late 1998, posed both motions. The commissioner
Mother became pregnant again, and a second hearing the matter determined that Thanos
son, Z.P., was born in September 1999.
lacked standing to contest Z.P.'s paternity.
113 Unbeknownst to Father, Mother had
H 6 Thanos and Mother objected to the
been involved in a romantic relationship with commissioner's standing decision. The trial
Thanos beginning sometime in 1996. Mother court determined that the issue was govbelieved from early on in her pregnancy with erned by In re J.W.F., 799 P.2cl 710 (Utah
Z.P. that Thanos was Z.P.'s biological father. 1990), and that it needed additional informaShe informed Father about her affair with tion to adequately address the policy considThanos and her belief about Z.P.'s paternity erations set forth in that case. The trial
in March 1999. Despite Mother's infidelity, court appointed Dr. Jill Sanders to provide
the Pearsons stayed together in an attempt the court with an independent Schoolcraft
to make their marriage work. Father analysis.2 Sanders was to address the secagreed to raise Z.P. as his own, and Mother ond prong of the Schoolcraft test—whether
agreed to treat Father as Z.P.'s natural fa- permitting Thanos to seek paternity of Z.P.
1. Thanos and Mother married in July 2002,
shortly after the trial court granted Mother's
request to bifurcate this case and entered a decree of divorce between the Pearsons. Thanos
and Mother subsequently had another child,
daughter A4.T., whose custody is not implicated
in this case. Also, despite the relationship between Mother and Thanos prior to N.P.'s birth,
there is no suggestion that Thanos is N.P.'s biological father.

2. The term "Schoolcraft analysis" refers to the
analysis set forth in In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990), and is named for the petitioner in
that case. A Schoolcraft analysis determines a
person's standing to challenge the presumption
of legitimacy of a child born into a marriage,
based primarily on two policy considerations:
"preserving the stability of the marriage and
protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." Id. at 713.
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would be disruptive to Z.P.'s relationship
with Father. She concluded that Thanos's
presence in Z.P.'s life would not be inherently harmful to Z.P. or to Z.P.'s relationship
with Father.
11 7 After considering Sanders's conclusions
and the Schoolcraft factors, the trial court
granted Thanos's motion to intervene in November 2002. Addressing the first prong of
the Schoolcraft analysis, the trial court concluded that "the interest in preserving the
stability of the [Pearsons'] marriage is not a
consideration, due to the fact that there is no
marriage to preserve. The stability was
shattered when the parties separated and
[Z.P.] was approximately nine months of
age." As to the second prong, the court
relied on Sanders's report to conclude that
Thanos's challenge would not be "disruptive
to Z.P. or an unnecessary attack on his paternity," and was "in the best interests of the
child:7

1110 The trial court granted Mother and
Thanos joint legal custody and primary physical custody of Z.P. Mother and Father were
granted joint legal custody of N.P., with primary physical custody in Mother. Father
was granted "joint physical custody time"
with N.P. and Z.P. The boys rotated between
households on a weekly basis, resulting in an
approximately equal amount of physical custody in each household.
1111 Father appeals from the trial court's
order allowing Thanos to intervene, its grant
of summary judgment to Thanos on the issue
of Z.P.'s paternity, and its custody determinations to the extent that they relied on
Thanos's paternity, and Father's non-paternity, of Z.P.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1-3] 1f 12 Father raises multiple issues
on appeal, but our decision rests on the
question of Thanos's standing to challenge
Z.P.'s paternity. Generally, a person's
standing to request particular relief presents
a question of law. See Washington County
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003
UT 58,1! 18, 82 P.3d 1125. To the extent that
factual findings inform the issue of standing,
" '[w]e review such factual determinations
made by a trial court with deference.'" Id.
(quoting Reams-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997)).
" 'Because of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying standing, we closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the
legal requirements for standing, granting
minimal discretion to the trial court.' " Id.
(quoting Kearns-Trihune Corp., 946 P.2d at
374).

118 Father and Thanos both filed motions
for summary judgment on the issue of Z.P.'s
paternity. On May 8, 2003, the trial court
granted Thanos's motion and denied Father's
motion. The court's ruling determined Thanos to be the natural, biological, and legal
father of Z.P.
19 The trial court issued its custody decision on May 11, 2004. Relying on its previous
paternity determination, the court applied
the parental presumption3 in favor of Mother over Father as regards to Z.P. The trial
court next determined that Thanos's parental
presumption over Father had been rebutted,
finding that for the first fifteen months of
Z.P.'s life, Thanos "did not have a strong
mutual bond" with Z.P., "did not demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice his own interests and welfare for [Z.P.], and generally
lacked the sympathy for and understanding
of [Z.P.] that is characteristic of parents generally." See Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649
P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (listing factors for
rebuttal of parental presumption). Accordingly, the trial court placed Father and Thanos on an equal footing and made its custody
determination between them based solely on
the best interests of Z.P. See id,

U 13 The trial court determined that, as of
November 2002, Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s
paternity would not affect the stability of the
Pearsons' failed marriage and would not constitute a disruptive and unnecessary attack

3. The parental presumption is "the presumption
in favor of awarding custody to a natural parent

over a nonparent." Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App
225,11 1,29 P.3d 676.
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on Z.P.'s paternity. See In re J.W.F., 799
P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, the trial
court found that Thanos had standing to
challenge Z.P.'s paternity under the Schoolcraft test.
[4] 1114 While we do not necessarily disagree with the trial court's factual findings
regarding the evolution of the relationships
between Z.P. and the various parties, we
determine that Thanos wholly lacked Schoolcraft, standing for a substantial period of time
prior to his establishment of a relationship
with Z.P. Even with the breakup of the Pearsons' marriage and the development of a
relationship between Z.P. and Thanos, we
cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion
that Thanos satisfied the Schoolcraft test by
November 2002. See id. at 713. Accordingly, we determine that the trial court erred in
allowing Thanos to intervene in this action.

Upon learning of the child's birth and the
abandonment proceedings in August 1986,
Winfield filed a petition for custody of
J.W.F., arguing that he was married to Linda and living with her at the time of conception. At this time, the parties had still not
obtained a formal divorce. See id.

1117 The standing issue in In re J.W.F.
was whether a guardian ad litem could challenge Winfield's custody petition and presumed paternity of J.W.F. The supreme
court noted that "the class of persons permitted to challenge the presumption of paternity
should be limited." Id. at 713. The court
then identified two "paramount consideration^]" that must guide standing decisions
in this context: "preserving the stability of
the marriage and protecting children from
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon
their paternity." Id. "[W]hether individuals
can challenge the presumption of legitimacy
A. Preservation of the Stability
should depend not on their legal status alone,
of Marriage
but on a case-by-case determination of
U 15 The trial court found that "the first whether the above-stated policies would be
prong of the Schoolcraft analysis—relating to undermined by permitting the challenge."
preserving the stability of the marriage—was Id.
not a consideration in this case, due to the
1118 In In re J.W.F., the parties' long
fact that there was no marriage between separation prior to the birth of J.W.F. led
[Father] and [Mother] to be preserved." Al- the supreme court to conclude that "[t]he
though we recognize that a divorce termi- stability of the marriage between Winfield
nates any particular marriage and leaves and Linda Schoolcraft was shaken long ago,
nothing to preserve, we still disagree with and their marriage is one in name only." Id.
the trial court's assumption that the first The supreme court permitted a challenge to
Schoolcraft prong loses all relevance upon Winfield's paternity in these circumstances,
divorce. Rather, we review the totality of deeming it "not inconsistent" with the stated
the circumstances to determine whether a policy of preserving the stability of the marparticular paternity challenge conflicts with riage. Id. Notably, each of the three cases
the policy goal of preserving the stability of cited in Schoolcraft in support of this concluthe marriage.
sion also involved situations where divorce or
U 16 The trial court apparently relied on In separation occurred prior to or nearly conre J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), to reach current with the birth of the child. See
its finding that preservation of marriage be- Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 106 (Utah 1986)
comes moot upon the divorce or separation of ("In May of 1981, plaintiff gave birth to a
the parties. In that case, Winfield and Linda child. Soon thereafter, she filed this action
Schoolcraft were married in 1984 and lived for divorce."); Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640,
together for approximately eight months be- 641 (Utah 1982) (addressing first husband's
fore Linda left Winfield. See id, at 712. In attempt to deny paternity where child was
November 1985, some seven months to a conceived during his marriage but born into
year after the parties separated, Linda gave a subsequent marriage between mother and
birth to J.W.F. Linda abandoned J.W.F. another man); Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d
shortly thereafter, and the State initiated 393, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974) (addressing
abandonment proceedings in December 1985. paternity question when child was yet "to be
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born" at the time divorce pleadings were
filed).
1119 By contrast, the Pearsons made substantial efforts to maintain their marriage
even though both parties knew midway
through Z.P.'s gestation that Thanos was the
likely biological father. The Pearsons disagree about their intent regarding Father's
relationship to Z.P. Father contends that
both he and Mother agreed that Father
would raise Z.P. as his child in all respects,
while Mother asserts only that she agreed to
stay and try to make the marriage work so
long as Father would not punish her or Z.P.
for her infidelity. The trial court made no
findings on the issue, but did find that the
Pearsons did not separate until Z.P. was
approximately nine months old.
1120 While not dispositive of Thanos's
standing, we determine that the Pearsons'
efforts to maintain their marriage after Z.P.'s
birth remain relevant to the Schoolcraft analysis, even post-divorce. The question is not
whether the Pearsons' marriage ultimately
failed, but rather whether the potential of a
challenge to Z.P.'s paternity would have undermined the Pearsons' marriage while it
was still in existence.4 Under Father's version of events, the possibility of raising Z.P.
as his own child without interference from
Thanos was perhaps the central issue motivating him to make the marriage work.
While Mother's version is substantially different, even her recollection indicates the
importance of the issue to Father, and her
own willingness to make the marriage work.
[5] 1121 In any event, the Pearsons
stayed together in marriage for over a year
after Father first became aware of Thanos's
paternity of Z.P. The trial court erred in
failing to recognize that the Pearsons' shared
parentage of Z.P. represented a stabilizing
force in their then-existing marriage, and
that the potential of a paternity challenge
4.

We note that Thanos's paternity challenge
arose entirely within the duration of the Pearsons' marriage, and that Thanos hied his motion
to intervene concurrently with Mother's responsive pleading in the Pearsons' divorce case, prior
to the actual decree of divorce.

5. We note that the public policy in favor of
preserving the stability of marriage, always

would diminish that stabilizing effect. Thus,
even after the Pearsons filed for divorce,
Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s paternity can be
said to have had some undermining effect on
the stability of the Pearsons' marriage within
the meaning of Schoolcraft's public policy
analysis.5 While the reality of the Pearsons'
ultimate divorce may minimize the importance of the first Schoolcraft prong, we cannot say on the facts of this case that it
obviates that prong altogether.
B.

Protection of Children from
Attacks on Paternity

U22 The second, and in this case more
problematic, policy consideration under the
Schoolcraft test is "protecting children from
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon
their paternity." In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710,
713 (Utah 1990). There are crucial distinctions between the Pearsons' case and In re
J. W.F. that lead us to conclude that Thanos's
challenge to Z.P.'s paternity is both disruptive and unnecessary.
1123 In In re J.W.F., J.W.F. was promptly
abandoned by his mother at birth, his natural
father apparently never sought or enjoyed
any parental role whatsoever, and his mother's husband, Winfield, never had custody of
J.W.F. or a relationship with him. See id. at
712-13. J.W.F. was a little more than one
year old at the time of the initial standing
dispute. Not surprisingly, the supreme
court had no trouble in determining that
allowing- J.W.F.'s guardian acl litem standing
to litigate his paternity would not constitute
an "unnecessary and disruptive attack[ ]" on
J.W.F.'s paternity. Id. at 713. The court
stated that "J.W.F.'s expectations as to who
his father is cannot be shaken by permitting
a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy.
The child has never had a relationship with
[Winfield] Schoolcraft, [or his biological fastrong in Utah, may be even stronger in light of
Utah's enshrineinent of so-called traditional marriage into its constitution in 2004. See Utah
Const, art. I, § 29 (Supp.2005); but see Citizens
foi Equal Prot. v. Bnuwig, 368 F.Supp.2d 980
(D.Neb.2005) (declaring a similar state constitutional amendment invalid on various grounds
including free association and equal protection).
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ther], or even his mother, so he has no
expectations as to who his father is." Id.
U24 Clearly, the present case does not
involve a lack of paternal relationships.
Rather, the trial court was presented with an
undisputed and ongoing paternal relationship
between Father and Z.P., as well as Thanos's
evolving relationship with Z.P. as a stepfather, and as the father of one of Z.P.'s siblings. In its November 2002 order granting
Thanos's motion to intervene, the trial court
explained its ultimate rationale on the unnecessary and disruptive prong:
The court cannot find that granting Mr.
Thanos the standing to intervene would be
disruptive to [Z.P.] or an unnecessary attack on his paternity. In this case, as
indicated by Dr. Sanders in her report,
Mr. Thanos has an established relationship
with the child and there is nothing in the
reports of Dr. Sanders that would suggest
allowing Mr. Thanos to intervene would be
adverse to the best interests of the child.
The report of Dr. Sanders, to the contrary,
indicates that it is in the best interests of
the child to allow Mr. Thanos to intervene^ 6]
The November order also recognized that
Father had "functioned as Z.P.'s father since
his birth."
1125 We have no reason to question the
trial court's findings as they relate to the
contents of Dr. Sanders's report or the existence of some relationship between Thanos
and Z.P. in November 2002. However, despite the paternal role that Thanos may
eventually have attempted to take, the undisputed facts of the case are that Thanos had
little interest or involvement in Z.P.'s life
until he was approximately sixteen months of
age. The trial court recognized as much in
its October 2001 order initially denying Thanos's motion to intervene: "Mr. Thanos was
6. Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 report concluded
that "[Groin a developmental and psychological
perspective, [Z.Pj's functioning is not inherently
disrupted by [Thanos's] involvement and [Thanos's] relationship with [Z.P.] is necessary to
[Z.P.]'s normal and positive development." Dr.
Sanders's supplemental report of August 26,
2002, further concluded that "[tjhere is no reason to believe that further disruption to the relationship between [Z.P.] and [Father] is intrinsi-

completely absent from [Z.P.'s] first year of
life, was absent for the first half of his second
year of life, and has had incidental contact
during the second half of the second year of
[Z.P.'s] life." As a result of this intentional
absence, Z.P. developed a paternal relationship exclusively with Father over the first
two years of his life, a relationship that both
Father and Z.P. apparently continue to foster to the present.
[6] 1126 The Schoolcraft analysis is not
intended to protect children from all attacks
on their paternity, but only those that are
disruptive and unnecessary. See id. In
evaluating the disruptiveness of a paternity
challenge, the supreme court focused on the
child's relationship with the existing father
figure and the child's "expectations as to who
his father is." Id. Here, the trial court found
in its October 2001 order that Father was the
"psychological father of [Z.P.]," that Z.P. had
"become closely bonded with [Father]," and
that those bonds were "critical." The trial
court further found as a factual matter that
to permit Thanos "to establish his paternity
of [Z.P.] and to be introduced at this point as
a father figure in [Z.P.'s] life would be immediately disruptive to the child's stability."
These facts leave little doubt that, at least as
of October 2001, Thanos's paternity challenge
would have been disruptive to Z.P.'s existing
paternal relationship with Father and Z.P.'s
expectations as to who his father was.
% 27 We see nothing in the record to indicate that the mere passage of time, or the
integration of Thanos into Z.P.'s life as Mother's husband, destroyed or even diminished
Z.P.'s paternal relationship with Father or
his expectations as to who his father was.
To the contrary, Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002
report found that "[Z.P.] identifies [Father]
as his father and their attachment is secure,
strong and healthy." Her supplemental recally linked to Mr. Thanos'[s] presence in [Z.P.]'s
life."
Mere involvement or presence in a child's life
is a very different thing than a legal challenge to
the child's paternity. Thus, we do not see Dr.
Sanders's reports as being responsive to the
Schoolcraft goal of "protecting [Z.P.] from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon [his] paternity." In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 713 (emphasis
added).
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port of August 26, 2002 confirmed that Z.P.
and Father shared a "strong and positive
parent-child attachment." Despite Dr. Sanders's other conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best
interests,7 her findings of a continuing paternal relationship between Z.P. and Father
should have been the central focus of the
trial court's Schoolcraft analysis.
11 28 In light of those findings, we cannot
say that Thanos's attack on Z.P.'s paternity
would not have been disruptive to Z.P.'s paternal relationship with Father and his expectations about whom his father was. The
entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to
intervene was to establish that he, rather
than Father, was to fulfill the paternal role in
Z.P.'s life. Whatever other effects Thanos's
challenge might ultimately have on Z.P., his
direct attack on Father's paternity of Z.P.
certainly fails the Schoolcraft directive of
avoiding disruption of existing paternal relationships.
1129 We must also examine whether Thanos's paternity challenge can be deemed
"necessary." Id. In re J.W.F. did not provide guidance on distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary paternity challenges,
and the trial court did not expressly address
the issue. We presume that, like the disruption element, the necessity element must be
analyzed primarily from the child's perspective rather than from Father's or Thanos's.
See id, (emphasizing a policy of "protecting
children" and analyzing disruption from the
child's perspective). We also assume, without deciding, that Schoolcraft standing always exists at birth and can be lost only
thereafter. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 78-304.14(2) (2002) (establishing standards by
which unmarried biological father can establish paternity so as to defeat adoption of his
child by another at birth).

after he voluntarily absented himself from
Z.P.'s life. From Z.P.'s perspective, he had a
father in Father from his earliest ability to
form paternal bonds. Had the Pearson marriage succeeded, Father would likely have
remained Z.P.'s father in all regards
throughout the foreseeable future. Dr.
Sanders found that, even when the Pearsons'
marriage failed, Z.P. continued to identify
Father as his father and enjoy a strong
paternal relationship with him. Thus, at the
time of the trial court's intervention order,
Z.P. had a father and was not in need of a
different one.
1131 We need not determine the exact
point at which Thanos's paternity challenge
became unnecessary for Schoolcraft purposes. It is sufficient in this case to determine that there existed a period of many
months during which Z.P. developed a strong
paternal relationship with a loving and willing presumed father. So long as that relationship continues, it cannot be said for
Schoolcraft purposes that Z.P. has any particular need for his paternity to be established in another man.s
II 32 Looking at the circumstances of this
case as a whole, we conclude that the trial
court should have deemed Thanos's attack on
Z.P.'s paternity both disruptive and unnecessary. Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s presumed
paternity became disruptive and unnecessary
when he allowed Z.P. to form paternal bonds
with Father, and will likely remain so, for
Schoolcraft purposes, as long as those bonds
continue.

C. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing
Thanos to Intervene
11 33 In light of our conclusions regarding
the application of the Schoolcraft factors to
this case, we determine that Thanos lacks
11 30 Proceeding under these assumptions, standing to challenge Z.P.'s paternity and
we cannot see how Thanos's ability to chal- that the trial court erred by allowing him to
lenge Z.P.'s paternity remained necessary intervene in the Pearsons' divorce action.
7. We are aware that disregarding Dr. Sanders's
conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best interests seems
counterintuitive given the central role that the
best interests standard plays in every case involving juveniles. Nevertheless, in the context of
determining standing to contest paternity, the
Schoolcraft test is the standard set by the supreme court to measure the child's best interests

as those interests balance against the rights of
others.
8. This is not inconsistent with Dr. Sanders's assessment that Thanos has a potentially valuable
role to play in Z.P.'s life. That role, however,
need not be as the primary father figure.
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While the Pearsons' marriage may be longdissolved, we must give some weight to the
fact that the Pearsons attempted to save
their marriage, and that Father's intent and
ability to raise Z.P. as his own were significant factors in that decision. Most significantly, however, an attack on Z.P.'s paternity
at this point would be disruptive of Z.P.'s
strong paternal relationship with Father, a
relationship that renders Thanos's challenge
unnecessary from Z.P.'s perspective. Under
these circumstances, Thanos does not have
Schoolcraft standing, and the trial court
erred in allowing him to intervene.

[7, 8] 11 35 By holding Thanos to a similar, if somewhat more generous, standard, we
recognize that a husband is presumed to be
the legal father of a child born into his
marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-117.2(2) (Supp.2005). In the vast majority of
marital births, the husband is also the natural, biological father of the child. However,
in the hopefully rare instance where a child
born into a marriage is fathered by another
man, the husband is nevertheless deemed the
father of the child, with all concomitant
rights and responsibilities, unless and until
his paternity is successfully challenged under
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. See id.
11 34 We analogize Thanos's status to that §§ 78-45g-101 to -902 (Supp.2005); id.
of an unmarried father seeking to establish § 30-1-17.2(4) ("A presumption of paternity
parental rights to his child in the face of the established under this section may only be
mother's intent to have the child adopted. rebutted in accordance with Section 78-45g607."). Essentially, an illegitimate child born
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2). Secinto a marriage is immediately subject to a
tion 78-30-4.14(2) sets out various requirede facto adoption by the mother's husband.
ments that an unmarried biological father9 We see no reason why a man who chooses to
must comply with in order to establish his procreate with the wife of another should be
paternity. See id. When the adoption in- granted significant latitude to challenge the
volves a child under six months of age, sec- husband's de facto adoption, while one who
tion 78-30-4.14(2) establishes specific acts, fails to timely establish his paternity of a
including initiating a paternity action, that child born to an unmarried woman is permathe father must take prior to the mother nently barred from doing so upon the mothexecuting her consent to the adoption. See er's mere consent to the child's adoption.
id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). The mother's consent
1136 Like any other unmarried father who
to adoption can be executed as little as twenfails to perfect his inchoate parental rights,
ty-four hours after the child's birth. See id. Thanos lost his standing to contest Z.P.'s
§ 78-30-4.19 (2002). A father who fails to paternity sometime during the early months
comply with the requirements of section 78- of Z.P.'s life. Despite the evolving circum30-14(2) has no standing to object to the stances of this case, we conclude that since
adoption and permanently loses his parental that time Thanos has not met, and to our
rights to the child. See id. § 78-30-4.14(5); knowledge still does not meet, the SchoolIn re adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70,1111 10- craft factors.10 Accordingly, the trial court
12, 984 P.2d 967 ("Under Utah law, 'an un- erred in granting Thanos's January 2001 momarried biological father has an inchoate in- tion to intervene and his subsequent motion
terest that acquires constitutional protection for summary judgment establishing his paonly when he demonstrates a timely and full ternity of Z.P.
commitment to the responsibilities of parentII. Z.P.'s Paternity and Custody
hood, both during pregnancy and upon the
child's birth.'") (quoting Utah Code Ann.
11 37 Our determination that it was error to
§ 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (1996)).
allow Thanos to intervene in the Pearsons'
9.

"Unmarried biological father" for purposes of
Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(2) means a man
not married to the child's mother, without regard
to whether the man is married to another. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.11 (2002) (repealed
2005) (defining "unmarried biological father");
id. § 78-30-1.1 (5) (Supp.2005) (same).

10. We express no opinion on the separate question of whether Schoolcraft standing, once lost,
can ever be regained due to changed circumstances.
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divorce action has inescapable consequences
for the trial court's paternity and custody
orders. With Thanos improperly joined in
this litigation, the trial court's consideration
of Thanos's motion for summary judgment to
establish paternity, and the genetic evidence
in support thereof, was error. And, of
course, the court's May 2003 order granting
Thanos's summary judgment on the issue of
his fatherhood of Z.P. was also erroneous
ancl is reversed.
1138 With Thanos and all of his various
pleadings and evidence out of the litigation,
Father remains the presumed and legal father of Z.P. See Utah Code Ann. § 3 0 - 1 17.2(2). Accordingly, the trial court erred in
applying the parental presumption in favor of
Mother 1 1 and against Father in making its
ultimate custody decision regarding Z.P. Other aspects of the trial court's supplemental
decree of divorce also rely, explicitly or implicitly, on Thanos's paternity of Z.P., and
these aspects of the final order are also
erroneous and must be revisited as appropriate.

Schoolcraft standing. Accordingly, the presumption of Father's legitimate parentage of
Z.P. remains unrebutted, and Father remains the legal parent of Z.P. The trial
court's supplemental decree of divorce, as
well as any other order entered below, is
reversed to the extent that it conflicts with
Father's legal status as Z.P.'s parent or was
premised on Thanos's paternity. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
11 41 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge
and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
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11. We recognize that Mother asserted Father's
non-paternity of Z.P. in her answer and in a
simultaneous motion to show cause, and that she
could have litigated Z.P.'s paternity on identical
evidence in Thanos's absence. Regardless of this
possibility, Z.P.'s paternity was actually litigated
almost exclusively between Father and Thanos,
an improper party. We rule today solely on the
issues before us, and neither Mother nor Thanos
argue on appeal that Mother's pleadings provide
an independent ground to affirm the trial court's
paternity finding.
More importantly, for all of the reasons set
forth in this opinion, Mother would also appear
to be barred from challenging Z.P.'s paternity on
the facts and posture of this case. She loo would
lack Schoolcraft standing, see In re J.W.F., 799
P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990), and her actions prior
to the initiation of divorce proceedings might
support a determination thai her challenge was

barred by equitable estoppel. See Dahl Inv. Co.
v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391,11 14, 101 P.3d 830
(listing elements of equitable estoppel); see also
Kristen D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717, 719
N.Y.S.2d 771, 772-73 (2001) ("Courts have long
recognized the availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812, 658 N.Y.S.2d 506
(1997) (applying equitable estoppel principles to
bar a paternity challenge). For the same reasons, Father would also appear to be barred
from seeking to disestablish paternity of Z.P.
should he ever choose to do so.
We express no opinion on whether Z.P. himself, the state of Utah, or any other person or
entity could ever challenge Father's paternity, or
the circumstances that might permit such a challenge.

